1. Introduction. The notion of measure-theoretic uniformity was presented in [23], [24]. In this paper the notion is first utilized in an arithmetic setting and then extended to hyperarithmetic theory and set theory. The recursion-theoretic concepts touched on are : the arithmetic, hyperarithmetic and analytic hierarchies of Kleene [12]; co-models of the hyperarithmetic comprehension axiom of Kreisel [16]; recursive ordinals [11] ; and hyperdegrees [13]. One of the recursion-theoretic results we prove is: if P(X) is a fl{ predicate with free set variable X and the set XP(X) has positive Lebesgue measure, then P(A) holds for some hyperarithmetic set A. A corollary of this result is: the set of all A'such that the ordinals recursive in X coincide with the recursive ordinals has Lebesgue measure 1 (see footnote (9), below). In the area of set theory we are largely concerned with showing how relative consistency results follow in a natural manner from the notion of measure-theoretic uniformity. We develop Cohen's independence results [2] as well as a result of Solovay [29] , [30] on the extendability of Lebesgue measure to all sets of reals. Solovay makes use of Cohen's forcing method, but he ingeniously replaces Cohen's finite forcing conditions by closed sets of positive measure. He shows: if ZF (Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory) is consistent, then ZF+ "there exists a translationinvariant, countably additive extension of Lebesque measure defined on all sets of reals"+ "the dependent axiom of choice" is consistent(2). We reprove Solovay's theorem with emphasis on the notion of measure-theoretic uniformity and with the help of some elementary properties of uniformly distributed, independent random variables; however, the fine details of our argument are not substantially different from those originated by Solovay. §4 of this paper, which deals solely with set theory, can be read independently of § §2 and 3, but it is intended to be read as a natural continuation of the earlier sections.
Our interest in applying measure-theoretic ideas to questions of mathematical logic began with the reading of Specter's measure-theoretic construction of two incomparable hyperdegrees [32] . Spector showed, using Fubini's Theorem and the measurability of analytic sets, that the set of all pairs (X, Y) such that X and Y are hyperarithmetically incomparable has measure 1. Shoenfield extended Spector's argument to show there exists an uncountable set of pairwise incomparable hyperdegrees. Feferman [3] obtained two incomparable hyperdegrees by means of a forcing argument, but Spector's proof, although less constructive than Feferman's, is much shorter. In [22] we showed : if X is not recursive, then the set of all Y such that the Turing-degree of y is incomparable with that of X has measure 1. In §3 we show : if A' is not hyperarithmetic, then the set of all Y such that the hyperdegree of Y is incomparable with that of X has measure 1. There is a significant conceptual difference between these last two results. The proof of the former of the two relies on the countable additivity of Lebesgue measure and on the following fact: if X is Turing-reducible to (i.e., recursive in) Y, then Xis reducible to T by means of one of countably many reduction procedures whose nature does not depend on Y (i.e., X={e}Y). In contrast, if X is hyperarithmetic in Y, then X is reducible to Y by means of a hyperarithmetic reduction procedure whose nature depends on the ordinals recursive in Y. Since the ordinals recursive in Y can be arbitrarily large countable ordinals, the proof of the latter of the above two results has to take into account uncountably many hyperarithmetic reduction procedures. This difficulty is overcome in §3 by showing that if one ignores a set of T's of measure 0, then one can assume the ordinals recursive in Y are the recursive ordinals.
It seems impractical at this point to give a general and formal account of the notion of measure-theoretic uniformity. Instead, we give a variety of examples and applications in the belief that the notion is simple enough to abstract from the examples. Let N be the natural numbers. We put the usual probability measure on 2N as follows. Let m be the unbiased measure for 2={0, 1}: m({0, 1}) = 1, m({0}) = m({l}) = i, and m(0)=O, where 0 denotes the empty set. Let ¡x be the product measure induced on 2N by N. Of course p is merely the product-space version of Lebesgue measure on the unit interval [0, 1] of the reals [10, p. 157]. What we need of measure theory can be found in Halmos [10] .
Let A(A, x, y) be a recursive predicate [12] of the set variable T and the natural number variables x and y. Thus the truth-value of A(A, x, y) for any actual choice of A e 2N and x, y e N is determined by finitely much information about the membership of A and the values of x and y. A familiar uniformity can be put as follows :
(T)[(x)(Ey)R(T, x, y) -> (Ef)(f recursive in A & (x)R(T, x,f(x)))].
(In fact, f(x)^pyR(T, x,y).) Another way of expressing this uniformity is: for each A, if the predicate (x)(Ey)R(T, x, y) has a Skolem function, then it has a Skolem function recursive in A. Thus in our study of the predicate (x)(Ey)R(T, x, y), we can reduce our attention from arbitrary Skolem functions to Skolem functions recursive in F. It is now quite natural to ask: can we reduce our attention still further to recursive Skolem functions ? The answer is yes, if we ignore a set of F's of measure 0, and if we replace Skolem functions by bounding functions: f is a bounding function for (x)(Ey)R(T, x, y) if (x)(Ey)yèflx}R(T, x, y). The existence of a bounding function is equivalent to the existence of a Skolem function. Proposition 1.1. Let R(T,x,y) be recursive. If the set of all T such that (x)(Ey)R(T, x, y) has measure 1, then the set of all T such that (Ef)[f recursive & (x)(Ey)y êfix)R(T, x, y)] also has measure 1.
Proof. It is enough to show: for each rational S>0, there exists a recursive/ such that {F| (x)(Ey)ySf(x)R(T, x, y)} has measure at least 1 -8 A stronger and more attractive proposition than 1.1, and one closer to the idea of measure-theoretic uniformity would be : the set of all F such that (x)(Ey)R(T, x, y) -* (Ef)[f recursive & (x)(Ey)yéHx)R(T, x, y)] has measure 1. Unfortunately, D. A. Martin has shown that for some recursive F this stronger proposition is false. We have to go to the language of arithmetic'to realize the full flavor of measure-theoretic uniformity. Theorem 2.2 of §2 states : let B(T, x, y) be arithmetic [12] ; then the set of all F such that
(x)(Ey)B(T, x, y) -+ (Ef)[f is arithmetic & (x)(Ey)yánx)B(T, x, y)]
has measure 1. In short, if we restrict F to a set of measure 1, then we can restrict ourselves, in our study of arithmetic predicates of T, to arithmetic bounding functions. The reduction from bounding functions arithmetic in F to arithmetic bounding functions is the essence of measure-theoretic uniformity in the arithmetic case.
2. The arithmetic hierarchy. Let B(T) be an arithmetic predicate of T. The set TB(T) is a Borel subset of 2N of finite rank and consequently is measurable. Let r be a variable ranging over the rational numbers in the unit interval [0, 1] . By making use of some standard Gödel numbering, it is possible to regard the predicate /ti(AA(A))gr as a number-theoretic predicate whose free variables are A (ranging over the arithmetic predicates) and r (ranging over the rationals in [0, 1 ] ). For each « > 0, an arithmetic predicate is said to belong to 2°, (11°) if it is expressible by means of a recursive matrix and a quantifier prefix beginning with an existential (universal) quantifier and passing through «-1 alternations of quantifiers. Recursive predicates are said to belong to both 2°, and n0,. 
B(T)^(Ei)i<k(Tebi)
for all A; furthermore, the finite union [J {o¡ | / < k} can be found effectively from a Gödel number of A(A). Clearly, ¡jl(ÎB(T))=p(\J {o¡ | i<k}). Now suppose «>0 and A(A) e 2°. Then A(A) is of the form (Ex)B(T, x), where A(A, x) e U°_x, and
The inductive hypothesis for (ii) implies that the right side of the above formula is 11°. Suppose instead that A(A) e 11°. Then A(A) is of the form (x)B(T, x), where B(T,x)eZ°_i,wd
where S is a variable ranging over the positive rationals. The inductive hypothesis for (i) implies that the right side of this last formula is n°+1. To see (iii) observe that the "effective" nature of the inductive step of the proof of (i) and (ii) implies the existence of a recursive function / with the following property: for each «2:0,/(«) is the Gödel number of a 11° predicate A/(n)(o, r) such that PfUb, r) <-> b is the Gödel number of A(A) & A(A) e 2° & ¡x(fB(T)) g r.
The predicate A/(n)(o, r), with «, o and r as free variables, is hyperarithmetic, since the truth set for arithmetic is hyperarithmetic.
In Theorem 2.2 we attempt to capture what we mean by measure-theoretic uniformity in the arithmetic case. A standard uniformity for arithmetic predicates of the form A(A, x, y) can be put as follows: if (x)(Ey)B(T, x, y), then (Ef)[f is
License or copyright restrictions may apply to redistribution; see https://www.ams.org/journal-terms-of-use arithmetic in T &(x)(Ey)ySHx)B(T, x,y)]. The corresponding measure-theoretic uniformity is obtained by demanding that the bounding function / be arithmetic rather than arithmetic in T. The cost of such a demand is a set of F's of measure 0. Theorem 2.2. Let B(T, x, y) be arithmetic. Then the set of all T's satisfying the following condition has measure 1 : if (x)(Ey)B(T, x, y), then (Ef)[f is arithmetic & (x)(Ey)yáHx)B(T,x,y)].
Proof. Let 8 be a positive rational. We define an arithmetic/such that p,(f(x)(Ey)yáfMB(T, x, y))+8Z p(t(x)(Ey)B(T, x, y)).
Let b(x,r) be the predicate: p(t(Ey)B(T,x,y))>r.
By Lemma 2.1, b(x,r) is arithmetic. Then/(x) is the least/ such that for all r, b(x, r) -+ p(f(Ey)y s ß(T, x, y)) > r-8/2* +1. Proof. First we consider a special case, where B(T) is n2, and then we show how to reduce the general case to the special case. Let B(T) be (x)(Ey)R(T, x, y), where R(T, x, y) is recursive. By Theorem 2.2, there is an arithmetic function/such that p(f(x)(Ey)yifix)R(T,x,y)) > 0.
There exists an arithmetic function cx such that for each x, cx is a finite union of basic open subsets of 2N and (Ey)yiKx)R(T,x,y)^Tecx.
For each x, let dx = C\ {c¡ | i^x}. Note that for each x, the closed set dx is nonempty, because p(TB(T)) > 0. If A is an arithmetic set such that (x)(A e dx), then B(A) holds/We define such an A by an induction on «:
A is arithmetical, since it is arithmetic in the function dx. Now we show how to reduce the general case to the special case by considering an illustrative example. Let B(T) be (x)(Ey)(u)(Ev)R(T, x, y, u, v), where R(T, x, y, u, v) is recursive. By Theorem 2.2, there is an arithmetic/such that f(x)(Ey)yáfix)(ü)(Ev)R(T, x, y, u, v) has positive measure. By using a trick of Kleene [12] , we can pass a bounded existential quantifier through a universal quantifier:
(Ey)yâHx)(u)(Ev)R(T, x, y, u, v) <-> (u)(Ey)yénx)(Ev)R(T, x, y, (u)y, v).
(3) Corollary 2.3 was independently obtained by H. Tanaka [34] . Call a set T fundamental (with respect to arithmetic) if A(A) holds for every arithmetic A such that p(TB(T)) = 1. It is possible to construct hyperarithmetic, fundamental (with respect to arithmetic) sets with the help of Lemma 2.1, but we prefer to deduce the existence of such sets as a corollary to Theorem 3.9. They behave very much like the generic (with respect to arithmetic) sets of Feferman [3] . In particular, they are not implicitly arithmetically definable ; that is, they are not unique solutions of arithmetic predicates.
3. The hyperarithmetic hierarchy. An analytic predicate A(A, x) (Kleene [12] ) is said to be U\ if it is expressible in the form (Y)A(Y, A, x), where A(Y, T, x) is arithmetic. Let A(A, x, y) be l~l\. A familiar uniformity due to Kreisel [16] can be put as follows : if (x)(Ey)P(T, x, y), then
The corresponding measure-theoretic uniformity is obtained by first discarding a set of A's of measure 0 and then requiring that the bounding function / be hyperarithmetic rather than hyperarithmetic in A. We develop this result (Corollary 3.12) and several related ones by studying a relativization of Kleene's ramified analytic hierarchy [14] . Very briefly, the ramified analytic hierarchy is obtained by starting with the empty set and iterating the process of analytic definability through the recursive ordinals(4). Kleene [14] showed that the ramified analytic hierachy is identical with the set of hyperarithmetic sets. Following Feferman [3], we relativize by starting with an arbitrary set A rather than the empty set(5).
(4) Many persons now use the term "ramified analytic hierarchy" to denote the result of iterating the process of analytic definability past the recursive ordinals to its endpoint j80.
(5) It might seem more natural to relativize by replacing not only the empty set by T but also the recursive ordinals by the ordinals recursive in T; however, it follows from Lemma 3.5 that this relativization is identical with the one we adopted for almost all T.
The relativization is described by a ramified, second-order language &(F), which differs little from Feferman's language <e*(ST) ([3, p. 335]). &(F) is the language of first-order number theory augmented by the constant symbol F denoting an arbitrary set of natural numbers, some second-order set variables, and the membership symbol (e). Let Ox be a \l\ subset of O such that Ox is linearly ordered by <0 and has order-type <ox (the least nonrecursive ordinal). (The existence of Ox is proved in [4] and in [6] .) Thus each recursive ordinal has just one notation in Ox ; if A is the unique notation in Ox for the recursive ordinal ß, we write |A|=j8. For each b e Ox, &(F) has ranked set variables X", Y»,Zb,...; 3?(F) also has unranked set variables X, Y,Z,..., a numeral « for each natural number «, and symbols for equality ( = ), successor ('), addition ( + ), and multiplication (•).
A formula F of ¿£(F) is said to be ranked if every set variable occurring in IF is ranked. The ordinal rank of a ranked sentence F is the least a such that a > | A| for every variable X" occurring in F. Let F be an arbitrary set of natural numbers. Following Feferman [3] , for each A g Ox, we inductively define a structure Jtb(T) and truth in the structure (J {Jia(J) \ \a\ < \b\}:
(i) A sentence F of ordinal rank á |A| is true in IJ {Jía{T) \ \a\ < \b\} if it is true when F is interpreted as F, the number variables of F are restricted to oj, and each set variable Xa of F is restricted to Jta(J).
(ii) For each formula @(x) (with only x free) of ordinal rank ^ |A|, let x@(x) denote the set {« | ^(«) is true in [J {J(a(J) \ \a\ < \b\}} ^b(T) consists of all sets of natural numbers defined in this manner.
We define M(J) = (J {Jfb(T) \beOx}. Let Jt=Jt(<p)=the set of all hyperarithmetic sets. A sentence F of ¿¡?(F) is true (in symbols, J((T) Y F) if it is true when each unranked variable is restricted to J((T) and the remaining symbols of F are interpreted according to (i) and (ii). It is a routine matter to choose a Gödel numbering for the formulas of ¿>f(F) with the following properties: the predicate "e is the Gödel number of a ranked formula of ¿£(F)" is u}; for each A g Ox, the predicate "e is the Gödel number of a ranked formula of Jt?(F) of ordinal rank < |A|" is recursively enumerable (uniformly in A). The assignment of Gödel numbers makes it possible to classify various relations involving the formulas of 3?(F~). We will occasionally blur the distinction between formulas and Gödel numbers of formulas.
The full ordinal rank of a ranked formula F is a function/: Ox -*■ co such that for each A g Ox, /(A) is the number of occurrences of (Xb), (EYb),... in F. If / and g are full ordinal ranks, then /< r g if
The relation < r is a well-ordering of the set of full ordinal ranks.
If @(x) is a ranked formula (with only x free), then F(x<i §(x)) denotes the result of replacing each occurrence of te YinF( Y) by &(t). (t is a number-theoretic term.) Proposition 3.1. Let ¡F(Yb) be a ranked formula in prenex normal form whose only free variable is Y". Let {@i(x) | /g «} be a finite sequence of formulas with only x free of ordinal rank g|o|. Then the disjunction V 'iún^'(x@l(x)) is equivalent to a prenex normal sentence of full ordinal rank less than that of(EYb)F(Yb). Proof. Spector observed that the intersection of all sets satisfying a 2J condition is nj; i.e., if A(X) is2J, then f] {X \ A(X)} is U\. We give an inductive definition of p(F) 2; r, restricted to ranked, prenex normal F and rational r, and then we note that the cases of our inductive definition can be expressed by means of *L\ closure conditions. The number-quantifier rank of F is the number of occurrences of (x), (Ay),... in F. The rank of F is the ordered pair (f, rri), where / is the full ordinal rank of F and m is the number-quantifier rank of F. We say (/, m) < (g, ri)
if/< r g or iff=g and m < n. The inductive definition of p(F) ^ r proceeds according to the rank of F.
Case 0. F has no quantifiers. The predicate p(F) ^ r, restricted to F without quantifiers and rational r, is recursive; i.e., p(iñeF)=\ etc. Case 1. F is of the form (EXb)Fx(Xb). Let {^(x) | zgO} be the uniform (in A) recursive enumeration of formulas with only x free of ordinal rank ^ |A|. Then p(F) ^ r is defined to be
where 8 is restricted to the positive rationals. By 3.1, Vism ^i(x@i(x)) is equivalent to a prenex normal sentence of full ordinal rank less than that of (EXb)Fx(Xb). Case 2. F is of the form (X»)Fx(Xb). Then p(F) ä r is defined to be
By the dual of 3.1, Aism ^iC^iM) is equivalent to a prenex normal sentence of full ordinal rank less than that of (Xb)Fx(Xb).
Case 3. F is of the form (Ex)Fx(x). Then p(F) ;> r is defined to be
where S is restricted to the positive rationals. By the same argument used to establish 3.1, V¡sm &i(0 te equivalent to a prenex normal sentence of lower rank than that of (Ex)Fx(x) ; in fact, the full ordinal rank will be unchanged but the number-quantifier rank will be less. 
AeA Since (EYc)A(x, Yc) is a ranked formula with only x free, it follows that
for all AeA Lemma 3.4 suggests : if a set of A's of measure 0 is avoided, then Jt{T) is very similar to Jt. The similarity is pursued further in Lemma 3.5, and is exploited to prove 3.7. The underlying cause of the similarity is expressed by Lemma 3.2, which says that the probability that a ranked sentence F is true in Jt(T) can be " computed" in J(. The use of the term "computed" is appropriate for two closely related reasons : the predicate p(F) 2t r, restricted to ranked F and rational r, is 21 in the sense of Jt (i.e., the existential set quantifier is restricted to the sets of Jf); and the predicate is metarecursive [17] as well.
Lemma 3.5. For almost all T, J((T) is the set of all sets hyperarithmetic in F(7).
Proof. The argument of Kleene [14, p. 35] , relativized to F, shows that the sets of Jt(T) are just those sets each of which is recursive in Hb for some A g Ox^Ot(b). According to Kreisel [15] , if F belongs to an co-model of the hyperarithmetic comprehension axiom, then every set hyperarithmetic in F also belongs to that co-model. Now apply 3.4. Proof. Let H be a hyperarithmetic set such that « g H <-► « is the Gödel number of a member of {Ft}. By Spector [31] there is a c e Ox such that the ordinal rank of F\ is ^ |c| for all i. Let VJ be the set of Gödel numbers of all formulas of ordinal rank S |c| which are true in J((T). By adapting the argument of Kleene [14, p. 36] , one can show that Vf is recursive in 77<S for some c' in Ox £ 0T (see footnote (8) 
The Gödel number of F can be found effectively from the Gödel number of {Ft}, since one can pass effectively from the Gödel number of {Ff} to c, c', and the Gödel numbers of @x and ^3. We prove by induction on the rank of F that (8)(E&)P(F, 8, <&). The cases are the same as those of 3.2. (We again assume that F is in prenex normal form.) The most Proof. By 3.7 it is safe to assume that {A | J/(T) VF}isa closed subset of 2N. We inductively define a sequence {@n | «2:0} of atomic sentences:
By 3.2 the set 77={« | <Sn h « e F} is hyperarithmetic. Clearly, Jt(H) r-F.
Theorem 3.9. IfiP(X) is Iii and the Lebesgue measure of XP(X) is positive, then P(H) holds for some hyperarithmetic H(9).
Proof. By Gandy [6] or Spector [33] , there is an arithmetic predicate stf(X, Y) such that
It follows from 3.5 that for almost all A,
By 3.8, Jt(Hx) N (EY)s/(F, Y) for some hyperarithmetic Hx. Since every member of Jt(Hx) is hyperarithmetic in Hx, there must be a hyperarithmetic H e Jt (Hx) such that s#(Hx, 77), and hence A(77), hold.
Theorem 3.9 is another example of what might be called a measure-theoretic basis theorem. Shoenfield's basis result [27] for U\ predicates states: if P(X) is 111 and (EX)P(X), then A(C) holds for some C constructible in the sense of Gödel [9] .
(9) Theorem 3.9 first appeared in Sacks [24] . Subsequently, H. Tanaka [34] independently developed another proof of 3.9 in which Corollary 5 of Sacks [23] (Corollary 3.10 of the present paper) is quoted but which avoids the formalism of the ramified analytic hierarchy. Another way of expressing Theorem 3.9 is: if P(X) is 11} and holds for every hyperarithmetic X, then P(X) holds for almost every X. We have suppressed a considerable amount of uniformity inherent in 3.9. It is not difficult to check: there is a partial recursive function/such that if e is the Gödel number of a 11} predicate P(X) and the Lebesgue measure of XP(X) is positive, then/(e) is defined and is the Gödel number of a hyperarithmetic set H such that P(H) holds.
The least ordinal not recursive in X is denoted by cof, the least nonrecursive ordinal by coĈ orollary 3.10. The set {X | cof = co,} has Lebesgue measure 1.
Proof. First observe that wf >wx is II}. By Gandy [6] or Feferman-Spector [4] there is a recursive linear ordering < R of the natural numbers whose maximal well-ordered initial segment has order-type wx. Then t»x>wx is equivalent to the following n} predicate : (Ee)[e is the Gödel number of a recursive-in-X well-ordering of the natural numbers ( < e)] & (/)[/is not a 1-1 order-preserving map of < e onto an initial segment of <B]. Now by Spector [31] , cof = wx for all hyperarithmetic H.
Then by 3.9, co^coi for almost all X. (10) S. Kripke has greatly strengthened Corollary 3.11 in the following direction: let K^2N be a set of measure 0 such that <j> $ K and such that any set of the same hyperdegree as some member of K is also a member of K; then the set of all X such that some Y e K is hyperarithmetic in X has measure 0. A set A is said to be implicitly arithmetically definable if it is the unique solution of some arithmetic predicate; i.e., there is an arithmetic B(X) such that (EXX)B(X) and B(A). It is well known that each hyperarithmetic set is recursive in some implicitly arithmetically definable, hyperarithmetic set. Feferman [3] showed by means of a forcing argument with finite conditions that there exists a hyperarithmetic set which is not implicitly arithmetically definable. The notion of fundamental (with respect to arithmetic) was defined at the end of §2.
Corollary 3.12. There exists a hyperarithmetic set which is fundamental (with respect to arithmetic). Each such set is not implicitly arithmetically definable.
Proof. A set A is fundamental (with respect to arithmetic) if for every arithmetic predicate B(X), Theorem 3.13. Let P(T, x, y) be HI. Then the set of all T satisfying the condition below has Lebesgue measure 1 : (x)(Ey)P(T, x, y) -* (Ef)HYP(x)(Ey)yánx)P(T, x, y).
Proof. By Gandy [6] or Spector [33] , there is an arithmetic formula s/(T, x, y, Y) such that for all A, m, and n :
By 3.5, we have for almost all A and all m, n:
Then for almost all A: (x)(Ey)P(T, x, y) ^ Jt(T) Y (x)(Ey)(EY)s/(F, x, y, Y). Theorem 3.13 is the instance of measure-theoretic uniformity we associate with hyperarithmetic theory ; by suppressing a set of F's of measure 0, we are able to restrict our attention from bounding functions hyperarithmetic in F (provided by Kreisel's Lemma [16] ) to bounding functions that are actually hyperarithmetic.
A sharpening of Theorem 3.13 will be useful.
Corollary 3.14. Let P(T,x,y) and Q(x, y) be n} formulas such that (x)(z) ■(Ey)ziyQ(x, y). Then the set of all T satisfying the following condition has Lebesgue measure 1 :
Proof. By 3.13, for almost all F there exists a hyperarithmetic g such that
Since (x)(z)(Ey)2éyQ(x, y), it must be that
But then for almost all F there exists a hyperarithmetic/such that
Let To, Tx, T2,... be an arbitrary sequence of sets of natural numbers. We turn our attention to the structure Jt(Tü, Tx, T2,...) introduced by Feferman [3] . The language ^(Fo, Fx, F2,...) differs from Sf(F) (described at the beginning of §3) only in that the set constant F has been replaced by the set constants $~o, F., F¿,... ; the structure Jt(T0, Tx, F2,...) is defined in the same manner as Ji(T). Each set constant ^ is of course interpreted as F¡. Each member of Jfb(TQ, Tx, F2,...) is defined by a formula ^(x) of ordinal rank ^ |A|, where A.g Ox. Note that each such formula ^(x) can explicitly mention only finitely many Fx\ ; thus it is possible that Jt(T0, Tx, T2,...) will not, in general, have a member in which all the Fj's are recursive.
We think of (F0, F», F2,...) as being a member of (2N)N. Lebesgue measure p. for 2N was defined in §1 as the product measure induced by the unbiased measure m on each factor 2={0, 1}. Lebesgue measure p for (2^)" is defined similarly. If F is a sentence of ^(F0, Fx, F2,...), then the set {(FcF^.-OI^Fo,^,...)^^} is a Borel subset of (2")" and so is Lebesgue-measurable ; let p(F), the probability that F is true in Jt(T0, Tx,...), be the measure of this set.
Let v and w be recursive functions such that the map h: N -> N x N, defined by «(«) = (v(n), w(ri)), is one-to-one and onto. Let x e (T)y be defined by (Eri)[n eT&v(ri) = x& w(ri) = y]. and r is rational, is \i\.
Proof. Same as 3.2.
By an instance of the 1\ axiom of choice, Kreisel [16] means the universal closure of any formula of the form : It easily follows that
The proof of Theorem 3.16 was little more than an application of Corollary 3.14, which was only a refinement of Theorem 3.13, the statement of measure-theoretic uniformity for the hyperarithmetic case. In the same manner, Lemma 3.4 and Theorem 3.9 can be viewed as consequences of Theorem 3.13. In short, if one keeps in mind the hyperarithmetic version of measure-theoretic uniformity, as expressed by Theorem 3.13, one can readily recover all the results of §3.
4. The constructible hierarchy. Let Jt be a countable initial segment of L, the class of constructible sets, such that Ji is a model of ZF, the axioms of ZermeloFraenkel set theory, and hence of V=L, the axiom of constructibility. (Jt=F"a for some countable ordinal a, where F is defined in Gödel [9] .) We utilize measuretheoretic ideas in the style of §3 to study the effect of adding an arbitrary set F of natural numbers to Ji. The resulting structure is denoted by Ji(T). Lemma 4.2 is the instance of measure-theoretic uniformity we associate with the constructible hierachy of Jt, and it readily implies that the replacement axiom holds in J/(T) with probability 1. In order to give a complete proof of Lemma 4.1, it is necessary to give some details concerning the structure of Jf(T). For this purpose the symbolism of Tharp [36] is convenient. The symbols of the language jSf° are: g (membership) ; unranked set variables x, y, z,... ; ranked set variables Xa, ya, z",... for each ordinal a of Ji; propositional connectives, and existential and universal quantifiers for both ranked and unranked set variables. The atoms of =S?° are of the form tx e t2, where tx and t2 are variables. The formulas of ¿if0 are constructed from the atoms and the logical symbols in the standard manner. We define a class # of constants (intended to name the members of Ji(T)) by induction on the ordinals of Ji.
(0)={«|«<co}. #(«+1): F tea member of ^(<x+1). Let <£(*", yx,..., yn) be a formula of S?°w hose only free variables are xa,yx,.. .,yn (w^O), and whose only quantified variables are of the form xß for ß less than or equal to a. Then x"(p(x", cx,..., cn), where each c ( (l¿i¿n) is either F or a member of IJ {^(ß) \ ß^a}, is a typical member of c€(a+1). W) = \J ÍW) I j8<A} for each limit ordinal A. no quantifiers, then l(F) = 3. For each sentence F, the countability of Jt implies that {A | Jt(T) Y F} is a Borel subset of 2N. For each F, the probability that F is true in Jt(T), denoted by p(F), is defined to be the Lebesgue measure of the Borel set corresponding to F. We have just given what might be called the external definition of the function p(F). In Lemma 4.1 we give the internal definition, i.e., a definition inside Jt. If 'S is an instance of the replacement axiom, then the fact that the replacement axiom is true in Jt together with the fact the probability function p(F) is ^-definable will suffice to show p(&) = 1. Hopefully, we will see this matter as a typical instance of the phenomenon of measure-theoretic uniformity. Of course the ^-definability of p(F) plays the same role here as the ^-definability of the forcing relation in Cohen [2] . The difference, if there is one, is thatp(F) has a trivial external definition.
Let A be an arbitrary set. We say A is ^-definable if there exists a formula F(x) of ZF with constants denoting elements of Ji such that A equals {a\ aeJi &a satisfies F(x) in Ji}.
Lemma 4.1. For each n ^ 0 : The function p(F), restricted to sentences F of£?(F) having at most n unranked quantifiers, is Ji-definable.
Proof. We consider only « = 0, since Cases 1 and 2 below make clear how to handle unranked quantifiers. We assume F is in prenex normal form and define 
1(F) > 1, then a(^) = a(F) and 1(&)<1(F). If 1(F) = 1, then a($)<a(F). The last
two assertions follow from the kind of elementary quantifier manipulation occurring in 3.1. Case 2. F is (Ex^F^x"). Dual to Case 1.
Case 3. F has no quantifier prefix. Thus F is a propositional combination of atoms of the form tx e t2, where tx, t2 e <€. If every atom of F has ordinal rank 0, then p(F) is easily computed from the information given in Case 3a. If some atom of F has ordinal rank > 0, then F is equivalent to a sentence of lower ordinal rank, as is indicated in Cases 3b, 3c and 3d.
Case3a. p(men) = l if m<n;p(m eF~)=\;p(F ern)=p(F eF)=p(m en)=0 if m^n.
Case 3b. o(tx) < o(t2). t2 must be of the form x0<j>(xe). tx e t2 is equivalent to <f>(tx). o(tx e t2)=ß+1 and ß^o(<f>(tx)).
Case 3c. o(tx) > o(t2). Then tx e t2 is equivalent to The proof of Lemma 4.1 relied heavily on the notion of prenex normal form. We comment further on this matter at the end of the paper. Lemma 4.2 is the instance of measure-theoretic uniformity we associate with the constructible hierarchy of Ji. It is analogous to Theorems 2.2 and 3.13, but there is a difference worth noting. Both 2.2 and 3.13 have the form: for almost every A there exists an/etc, but 4.1 has the form : there exists an / such that for almost all A etc. The difference is a consequence of the strong "closure" properties of the constructible hierarchy. Lemma 4.2. Let P(x, y) be a formula of ¿P(F) whose only free variables are x and y. Then there exists an Jt-definable function f such that for allaeJt with probability 1:
(xa)(Ey)P(xa, y) «-> (xa)(Eyf(a))P(xa, ym)).
Proof. Let g(a, ß) =p((xa)(Eyß)P(xa, /)); g is ^-definable by 3. 
Jta(T)YFn^Jte(T)YP(ñ).
The existence of P(x°) follows from two facts : (a) truth in Jia(T) has a first-order definition (uniform in F) with quantifiers restricted to Jia+(a(T); (b) every firstorder definable subset of a member of Ji(T) is a member of Ji(T). The desired F is (Ex°)P(x°).
Lemma 4.5. For each «2:0, there exists an Ji-definable function \F\F*, defined for all sentences F of F? (F) having at most n unranked quantifiers, such that p(F <-> F*) = 1 and F* has countable (in the sense of Ji) ordinal rank.
Proof. Similar to 4.1. We consider «=0 only, assume F is in prenex normal form, and define F* by induction on the rank of F If F has countable ordinal rank, then F* is F. Let F have uncountable ordinal rank. Suppose F is (Ex")Fx(xa). Then If F is (x")Fx(xa), we proceed in a manner dual to the above. If F has no quantifier prefix, then F is equivalent, as we saw in 4.1, to a sentence of lower ordinal rank. Lemma 4.6. Let a be a cardinal of Ji. Then p(a is a cardinal ofJi(T))=l.
Proof. We sharpen the argument of 4.2. Let a be an uncountable cardinal of Ji, and let ß e a. We show p(ß can be mapped 1-1 onto a)=0. Let/be a constant ŵ hich denotes a function from ß into a. For each y eß, let k(y) = {r\rea&p(f(y) = r) > 0}.
By 4.1, Ay | k(y) is ^-definable. Since / denotes a function and p is countably additive in the sense of Ji, it follows that k(y) is a countable set of Ji for all y e ß. But then \J {k(y) \ y e ß} is a subset of a of cardinality (in the sense of Ji) less than that of a, and consequently, P({f(y) I y £/3} £ U {k(y) \yeß}*a)=i. Proof. We first sharpen the argument of 4.7, and then exploit the fact that the generalized continuum hypothesis holds in Jt. Let a be an infinite ordinal of Jt, and a+ be the least ordinal greater than a of higher cardinality in the sense of Jt. is at most that of d with probability 1. We now develop Cohen's results concerning the independence of the continuum hypothesis by making purely notational changes in the proof of Theorem 4.9. Let y be an uncountable cardinal of Jt. We study the structure Jt(Ty), where Ty is an arbitrary subset of y. The language S£(Fy) is similar to the language .5?(F) (=SC(Fa)) except that F is replaced by Fy and ?(0) = {« \ new} is replaced by {ß | ß<y}. Jta(Ty) is defined in the same manner as Jta(T) save that Jt0(Ty) = y rather than w. Since y is countable, the product measure on 2y closely resembles the product measure on 2N. If F is a sentence of £?(Fy), then the set ¡jy | Ty e 2» & Jt(Ty) Y F} is a Borel subset of 2y; its Lebesgue measure, denoted by p(F), is the probability that F is true in Jt(Ty). The cardinality of the set of sentences of ¿tf(Fy) of countable ordinal rank is y ; so k(c) can be regarded as function from w to y. It follows {k(c) | c e ?} is a set (in Jt) of cardinality at most ya=y, since (in Jt) y is not cofinal with w and the generalized continuum hypothesis holds. But the cardinality of 2t0 (in Jt(Ty)) is at most that of {k(c) \c e ?} with probability 1.
Let (A0, Tx, T2,... ) be a sequence of arbitrary subsets of 2N. We now study the effect of adjoining (A0, Tx, T2,...) to Jt in the same measure-theoretic fashion we studied the effect of adding an arbitrary Ato Jt. The language ¿¡? (F0, Fx, F2 It is instructive to consider why 4.8 now fails. The last line of the argument of 4.8 assumes the existence of an ^(F)-definable function which assigns to each set of Ji(T) a constant of *? that denotes it; the function is obtained by assigning F to F and then exploiting an ^-definable well-ordering of the formulas and constants of S?(F). In the present case, the language J? (F0, Fx, F2 ,... ) has an -definable well-ordering, but with probability 1 (as we shall see below) there is no Ji(T0, TX,T2,.. .)-definable function which assigns FK to F, for all i<w. Ji(T0, Tx,...) has certain symmetries studied by Cohen [1] , Feferman [2] , and Solovay [29] , [30] which we shall study in terms of measure-preserving transformations of (2")". Let r be a function whose domain is {FK \ i e co} and whose range is a subset of ^(1); r can be extended to a function from ^€ into ^ as follows: 
.).
We say r is a map from #(1) onto 'íf(l) if r is a map from <^(1) into ^(l) and if for each i e w, there is a ut e ^(1) such that r(ui)=Fi (11) . If r is a map from "t#(l) ontô (1) , then r* is a 1-1 map from (2N)N into (2*)". (") Let c, de <é. We say c = rfif c and ¿/denote the same member of ~#(T0, Ti, T2,...) for all (T0, Tx, T2,. ..). J. Rosenthal [21] has shown that this notion of equality is ^-definable. His result is not needed in the present paper. xa,b) ).
The second formula is equivalent to the third by the induction hypothesis. Proof. Let JÍ = Jt(JQ, Tx, A2,...) be a model of ZF with the allowable exception of the power set axiom. Fix k 2; 0. In Jf we can define truth in Jf for all ranked sentences whose ^-symbols are included in the list F0,...,Fk_x.
It follows by standard arguments that there exists a 1-1 ^"-definfible map hk of Jt(T0,..., Tk_x) into ?(^To,..., Fk_x), i.e., each set of Jt(T0,..., Tk-X) is mapped to a constant of (■^o, ■ • .,&k-i) which denotes that set. But there exists an ^-definable (hence Jf-definable) well-ordering of?. The definition of hk has A0,..., Tk-X as parameters. Similarly, with probability I,
Proof. Let k = 1. To prove the first half of the lemma, it is enough to prove : for each sequence c0, cx,..., cn e(€(a), there exists a sequence r(c0), r(cx),..., r(cn) G^(a;^,^i)suchthat
Let m be so large that c0, cx,...,cne<€(a; F0,..., Fm). Consider the following map r of V(l) into #(1):
It is not difficult to check that r maps #(1) onto <ë(l) and that r* is measurepreserving(12). Clearly, r(c¡) e<#(a; F0, Fx) and r(F(ct)) is F(r(c{)) for each i¿n. Now apply 4.12.
We specify some maps of %(l) into #(1) needed for the proof of Lemma 4.15. It is not hard to see that (rf)* : (2N)N -> (2")^ is measure-preserving (see footnote (12)). We claim that r™ maps %(l) onto <ë(l). Consider the constant d™ e <g(l) defined by x°e</> (Ey°)(y° e Fm+" & x° = 2ny° + 2"-1)
(12)Cf. Halmos[10,p. 159(7)].
Clearly, r%(d%)=Fm. Thus r™ is a map of ?(1) into ?(1) which meets the hypotheses of Lemma 4.12.
Lemma 4.15 (R. Solovay). With probability 1, the dependent axiom of choice holds in Jt(T0, Tx, T2,...).
Proof. Let F(x, y) be a formula of SC(F0, Fx,...) whose only free variables are x and y and all of whose ^¡-symbols are included among F0, Fx,..., Fm_x («.2:0). We intend to find an/e?(^>,..., Fm) such that/denotes a function on w and such that with probability 1,
For the sake of notational simplicity, let m = 1. By 4.14, for each « 2t 0, the following two sentences are equivalent with probability 1 :
With the aid of 4.12, we apply rl+x to the above pair of sentences to obtain another pair equivalent with probability 1 :
(Note: Jt(F0, (Fx\,..., (Fx)n) denotes the collection of all sets of Jt(T0,Tx, T2,...) denoted by constants of the form r¿+1(c) for some c e ^ (F0, Fx,..., Fn+X) .) It follows from 4.13 that the sequence of sets Jt(F0, (Fx)0,..., (Fx)n) («2:0) can be well-ordered uniformly in « with probability 1. But then for some/e ?, we have with probability 1 : if (x)(Ey)F(x, y), then
We can insist that/e ^(F0, Fx), since the constants that denote the well-orderings needed in the definition off are members of ^(F0, Fx). The argument of Lemma 4.15 can be greatly simplified, if one merely wishes to establish the countable axiom of choice (see footnote (2)). In fact, Proposition 4.13 and Lemma 4.14 readily imply: with probability 1, the product of a family of nonempty sets, indexed by a well-ordered set, is nonempty.
A very simple notion of conditional probability of truth in Jt(T0, Tx, T2,...) will make it possible to strengthen Lemma 4.12. Let {F¡\ ieK} be a finite set of .^-symbols ; let At £ w for each / e K. The conditional probability that F is true in Jt(T0, Tx, T2,...), given that Ti = Atfor all i e K, is denoted by p(F\Fi = Ai,ieK), and is defined as follows. Let (2W)£ be the set of all sequences (F0, Tx, T2,...) such that F¡ = Ai for all i e K. Think of (2N)% as the product of countably many copies of 2N and finitely many one-point spaces, one one-point space {At} for each i e K. Give each copy of 2N the usual Lebesgue measure, and give each one-point space measure 1. Let (2N)g have the product measure induced by the measures assigned to its factors. Then p(F \ Fi=Ait ie K) is the measure of the set of all sequences (T0, Tx, F2,...) of (2N)% such that F is true in Ji(T0, Tx, T2,...).
Let r be a map of (ë(l) into ^(1). Then for each i, r(F^) is a member of '£(1) in which only finitely many ^¡-symbols occur. Suppose for each z, either all or none of the ^-symbols occurring in r(Ft) also occur in the set {Fx \ i e K}. We describe this state of affairs by saying that fixing {Ft\ ie K} has the effect of fixing {r(F\~) \ i e Kr}, where Kr is the set of all i such that every «^¡-symbol occurring in r(F¡) also occurs in {Ft | i e K}. We will always assume, for convenience only, that K and Kr are finite. Observe that fixing F, = ^( for all z'gF has the effect of fixing r*(F()=Ff for all i e Kr, where F( is the set in Ji(T0, Tx, T2,... ) denoted by r(F¡) when Tt = At for all i g K. Proof. We extend the argument of 4.12. The map r*: (2N)N -> (2N)N is 1-1. Let r% be the restriction of r* to (2NfK. Then r* is a 1-1 map of (2NfK into (2N)%r. The lemma will now follow from 4.11, after we show r* is measure-preserving. Let {d | i e co} be a sequence of constants of <€ which denote subsets of co. We say {c\ | z ^ «} is a sequence of independent, uniformly distributed w-terms if We say {q | z g co} is a sequence of independent, uniformly distributed co-terms if {c( | z ^ «} is such a sequence for all n ^ 0. It follows from 4.12 that {r(Ft) \ i e co} is a sequence of independent, uniformly distributed co-terms. This last fact implies r% is measurepreserving (cf. Halmos [10, p. 191-192] ). Then for every sequence {At \ ie K} of subsets of co, p(F | F=Ai, ieK) = 0 or 1(13). Then the desired F* is M?(F0, Î).
Note that the above argument merely establishes the existence of F* and not itŝ -definability. The ^-definability of F* is a consequence of the ^"-definability of the probability function/? (restricted to sentences of £?(F0, Fx,...) having at most « unranked quantifiers) and the following characterization of F* up to a set of measure 0 : p(F <-> F*) = 1 ; F* has countable ordinal rank and contains no Fr symbol not occurring in F. . These changes will be small but important; our sole purpose is to insure that ?*(1) is as symmetrical as 
We must show cn=^"n + /i is a projective, uniformly distributed cu-term. For this purpose, it is convenient to think of the co-terms of ? as random variables [5] defined on the sample space (2")". An co-term is uniformly distributed in our sense if and only if it is uniformly distributed in the standard sense when it is interpreted as a random variable. Thus if c0,..., cn is a sequence of uniformly distributed co-terms such that c¡ and c¡ (Og/</g«) have no ^-symbols in common, then c0,. ..,c" is a sequence of independent, uniformly distributed co-terms (cf. Halmos Lemma 4.23 strongly suggests that pi is a good candidate for a countably additive, translation-invariant extension of Lebesgue measure to all subsets of 2N in Jt*(Jo, Tx, F2,...) for almost all (T) = (T0, Tx, F2,...). We shall of course cfirry out this suggestion, but there is a delicate problem, easily overlooked, that we must face immediately. The definition of pi was given by means of terms denoting subsets of 2N in Ji*(To,Tx,T2,...).
With probability 1, there is no map in Ji*(T0, Tx, T2,...) which associates with each subset of 2N a term denoting that subset; this follows from the argument of Theorem 4.18. Nonetheless, we are able to define pi in Ji(T0, Tx,...) for almost all (T) = (TQ, Tx,...) by exploiting the measure-theoretic symmetries of ^*(1). In fact, Lemma 4.24 is the sole reason we insisted that every co-term of ^*(1) be projective and uniformly distributed. 
.)-definable maps/and
A such thatf(s) = R(xn, y) is a ranked formula of £?*(F0, Fx,...) in which no ^-symbols occur, b(s) = b is a subset of co in Ji*(T0, Tx, T2,...), and xnR(xn, y) denotes s in Ji*(Jo, Tx, T2,...) when y is interpreted as A. The set A is merely an encoding of the finitely many F¡'s that are denoted by J7-symbols in some term denoting s; it is easily checked that all such encodings can be accomplished by projective, uniformly distributed co-terms (cf. d™ defined immediately preceding 4.15). Thus A is denoted by some term c(F0, Fx, F2) e ^*(l), and pl(s) = p*(R (F3, c(F0, Fu F2) ) \Fi = Ti,iú 2).
Unfortunately there is (with probability 1) no Ji*(T0, Tx,.. .)-definable map A such that h(r) = c(F0, Fx, F2). But, thanks to the symmetry of ^*(1), we don't need c. Thus the transition described in the previous paragraph from homomorphisms to "near-homomorphisms" might correspond to a transition from sets to degrees of sets.
